So last post I wrapped up the discussion on the "ick factor" by arguing that the foundations of all ethical systems essentially had presuppositions based upon what some find "icky." We might find human suffering as distasteful, so we seek to limit it. There are good, evolutionary reasons why we find certain things icky or distasteful--for example, if enough people found babies icky and distasteful (and maybe found infanticide not-icky), then the human race would quickly die out.
But it's hardly earth-shattering to accept these utilitarian arguments...nor do they offer any kind of ultimate moral clarity to the situation. One can challenge the assumption that underlies this by asking "why is the survival of human beings considered a good?" Indeed, in a materialist point of view, there is no "ultimate" good, no telos for the universe. (One could argue, indeed, that the good of many species would be enhanced by humanity being taken out of the picture. Indeed, some do argue this.)
So there is the non-materialist proposition: what if, beyond the cosmos, there is a Being (beyond Whom there is nothing greater) that has in mind a telos for the cosmos? This is the usual answer of theistic systems when challenged to give a foundation for their moral framework: we believe that some things are good because they move us closer to the telos that God intended for the universe; other things are evil when they move us further away from that telos.
But, the materialist may argue, what if that telos is one of suffering and pain? What if, in a word, God is evil?
And the materialist making this argument will gladly point out things in the universe as evidence to support this claim. If there is a God, then why is there so much suffering? Why do people who do evil things often prosper, and those who do good things suffer and die?
Or turning to the Bible, the materialist will point out events in which God does (or orders to be done) things that we might call "evil". If he is good, why then is this the case?
There is a weak way to present this argument, and a stronger way. The weak way is not conscious of the standard by which he or she is judging God's actions (or lack of action) as "good" or "evil." This position is that of unexamined utilitarianism, where it's merely assumed that certain things are objectively "good" or "evil." In effect, the materialist here neatly takes him- or herself out of the equation and assumes the position of moral arbiter, outside of the observed universe. (This can also be a failing of the materialist view of rationality as well, but that topic's for another day.)
But the stronger approach doesn't make this error. Rather, the stronger form looks for consistency in an ethical system. If a purported ethical system is internally inconsistent, it is assumed false (such as a scientific model that is inconsistent in its approach.) Thus, it makes no immediate judgment on the first principles; rather, it simply tests if these principles are consistently applied, and if not, it appears as though the system does not cohere, it does not "hang together"--it is incoherent. It is not based on a single axiom from which the various points are related.
So to call God "good", one must have an idea of what is good. Some theists will argue "good is whatever God wills", but then "good" simply becomes a synonym for "God's will" and it tells us nothing. In the broadest sense, it would mean that there is nothing evil, for an all-powerful God can accomplish anything, and therefore, if He didn't want something to happen, He could and would stop it. If it happens, He must be ok with it--therefore, by this definition, it cannot be evil, it is "God's will." This isn't precisely Leibniz' optimism (since God is good, we live in "the best of all possible worlds"), it's simpler and broader than that: merely the assertion that if something happens, it's good, because "whatever is, is right" (yes, I know Pope was deeper than that--but this phrase sums up this view.)
Though some theists will accept this implication and be completely fatalistic, most theists have a concept of good and evil--yes, evil exists, but also yes, God is all-powerful. How is this reconciled?
One thing to consider is that "good" must always have a referent. That is, "good" is never abstract--it is always good--for whom? Some might consider a well-prepared beefsteak as "good", with the unnecessary addition "for me" and ignore how the bovine who expired in order to harvest the steak may not consider it "good." Indeed, a bear eating a human might subjectively consider the human a good meal (I don't know if bears feel this way, but the fact that the bear was nourished surely causes some primal sense of satisfaction in the ursoid brain), but humans will normally be horrified at the thought of anyone being eaten by a bear.
Now, as humans, we tend to think of "good" in the sense "good for humanity" (or, sometimes more selfishly but more honestly, "good for me.) And again, we get back to the utilitarian assumptions of maximizing human happiness as a measurement of "good." And in our particular western culture, it seems axiomatic that when we speak of God being good, we must mean that He's good for humanity.
Indeed, popular theology presents God as pretty much existing for the benefit of human beings. This idea is often summed up as "Moralistic Therapeutic Deism" (MTD for short). The idea is that God's identity of being "good" is fully identified as "good for people." And the idea of what is good for people is bound up with temporal happiness and being nice.
But this idea is not necessarily where historic theism comes from. Indeed, it is a relatively modern mutation of historic faith. And I'll continue on this thought next post, God willing.
Click here to see the rest of this comic.
No comments:
Post a Comment